What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy by Skeel, David A., Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2015 
What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy 
David A. Skeel Jr. 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Finance Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Public 
Economics Commons, Retirement Security Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Skeel, David A. Jr., "What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy" (2015). Faculty Scholarship at 
Penn Law. 1387. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1387 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
SKEEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/2015 12:32 PM 
 
675 
WHAT IS A LIEN? LESSONS FROM 
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 
David A. Skeel, Jr.* 
This Article considers two related sets of questions that have re-
cently taken center stage in the municipal bankruptcies of Detroit and 
other cities. First, what is the relationship between liens and lien sub-
stitutes, such as priorities and exceptions from bankruptcy’s automat-
ic stay? As similar as liens and priorities are, the bankruptcy laws 
have long drawn a sharp distinction between state-created liens, which 
are honored in bankruptcy; and state-created priorities, which are not. 
The second question is the question in the Article’s title: what is a 
lien? Whether a purported lien actually is a lien is not always clear, 
especially if the lien is created by statute rather than by the parties 
themselves. The Article attempts to make sense of existing law, advo-
cates a functional approach to liens and priorities, and questions 
whether courts should honor a statutory lien that lacks the key attrib-
utes of a lien. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the initial shock of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing wore off, and the 
parties attempted to tackle the major issues that stood in the way of a 
successful adjustment of the city’s debts, an unlikely issue kept coming 
up: what exactly is a lien?1 In ordinary bankruptcies, this question is not 
much in dispute. The parties may disagree on the value of the collateral 
securing the principal lender’s security interest, but it generally is clear 
whether the lender or other creditors do indeed have a property interest 
or its equivalent. 
Not so in Detroit. Some of Detroit’s general obligation (“GO”) 
bondholders believed that their bonds could not be restructured due to 
Detroit’s promise to use its “full faith and credit” to assure repayment.2 
Prior to the Detroit bankruptcy filing, as two investment experts at 
Cumberland Advisors wrote, “the general-obligation pledge was still 
considered a secured claim and ‘sacrosanct’—senior to all other claims 
against a debtor, requiring the debtor to raise taxes to repay bondhold-
ers.”3 Even after it became clear that ordinary GO bonds are simply un-
secured claims in bankruptcy, the holders of “unlimited tax” GO bonds 
insisted that they had a lien on Detroit’s ad valorem taxes, and that this 
lien must be recognized in bankruptcy. The beneficiaries of Detroit’s two 
major pensions insisted that they too were fully protected, due to a pro-
vision in the Michigan constitution stating that accrued pensions cannot 
be “diminished or impaired.”4 In 2005, Detroit entered into a swap trans-
action designed to stabilize the interest rate it paid on bonds that were 
issued to plug a gap in its pension funding.5 The swap transaction was re-
structured three years later to give the counterparties a lien on Detroit’s 
casino revenues.6 This transaction also raised lien-related issues.7 
One of the objectives of this Article is simply to sort through these 
issues and to determine why some of these creditors had liens or lien-like 
protection and others did not. Answering this question will require an 
exploration of two related sets of concerns. First, what is the relationship 
between liens and lien substitutes, such as priorities and exceptions from 
bankruptcy’s automatic stay? As similar as liens and priorities are, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Through the Article, I use the term “lien” broadly, as the Bankruptcy Code does, to encom-
pass security interests in personal property, mortgages, judicial liens, statutory liens and the like. See 
11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2012). 
 2. David Skeel, The Education of Detroit’s Pension and Bond Creditors, 2 PENN WHARTON 
PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE 1, 3 (2014), available at http://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/166-a. 
 3. John Mousseau & Michael Comes, Detroit Bites Again, CUMBERLAND COMMENTARIES 
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.cumber.com/commentary.aspx?file=020314.asp. 
 4. MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 24. 
 5. Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Wins Judge’s Nod for Contract Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
11, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/judge-approves-pact-to-end-detroit-swap-deal/?_php 
=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 6. For a summary of the swaps transaction and Detroit’s settlement of the swaps counterpar-
ties’ claims for $85 million, see id. 
 7. I do not analyze the swaps transaction further in this Article, because the issues are some-
what different than the issues covered here. 
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bankruptcy laws have long drawn a sharp distinction between state-
created liens, which are honored in bankruptcy; and state-created priori-
ties, which are not.8 We will want to consider why this is so. 
The second question is the question in my title: what is a lien? The 
dictionary defines a lien as “[t]he right to take and hold or sell the prop-
erty of a debtor as security or payment for a debt.”9 Not a bad definition, 
but whether a purported lien actually is a lien is not always clear, espe-
cially in the municipal context. Shortly before the little town of Central 
Falls, Rhode Island filed for bankruptcy, the Rhode Island legislature 
passed a statute giving general obligation bondholders a lien on all of a 
municipality’s ad valorem taxes and general revenues—that is, on nearly 
all of the municipality’s revenues.10 Blanket liens are hardly unheard of; 
most small businesses and many large ones have lenders who have a se-
curity interest in most or all of their assets. Yet despite using the lan-
guage of liens, the Rhode Island statute seems to function more like a 
priority rule than a traditional lien. The breadth of the statute raises the 
question whether a court should decline to honor a statutory lien if it 
does not serve the functions of a traditional lien. 
I lay the groundwork for the Article in Part II, which briefly com-
pares liens and a variety of lien substitutes. In Part III, I recount the his-
tory of bankruptcy’s statutory lien provision, which honors state liens but 
not state priorities and requires that the lien be good both in bankruptcy 
and outside of bankruptcy. In Parts IV and V, I turn to general obliga-
tion bonds. My focus in Part IV is the status of general obligation bonds 
in Detroit, a question which turned out to have different answers for the 
two different types of Detroit GO bonds. In Part V, I explore Rhode  
Island’s remarkable statute purporting to give a sweeping lien to GO 
bondholders. I then discuss the question whether pensions can be re-
structured in bankruptcy in Part VI. I conclude—as did Detroit’s bank-
ruptcy judge—that they can, and that the precise status of pension claims 
turns in large part on bankruptcy’s treatment of trusts. 
As is no doubt already evident, much of my analysis is descriptive: I 
am simply trying to determine the treatment of various kinds of credi-
tors. But my answers also will take me well into normative territory, as I 
consider the implications of protecting, or not protecting, particular 
kinds of entitlements. 
II. LIENS AND LIEN SUBSTITUTES 
Although my particular interest in this Article is liens, we cannot 
talk about liens without considering alternative protections that achieve 
the same or a similar effect. If I am a creditor whose debtor files for 
bankruptcy, a lien is one of many different protections that may assure 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (2012). 
 9. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 728 (2d College ed. 1982). 
 10. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1(a) (West 2014). 
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that I receive a higher payout than ordinary unsecured creditors. If my 
obligation is entitled to a statutory or other priority,11 this priority also 
will leapfrog me ahead of ordinary creditors. If my obligation is not sub-
ject to the discharge, either because I do not have a claim in the bank-
ruptcy or because my obligation is nondischargeable, this too may ensure 
that I recover more than an ordinary creditor (so long as the debtor does 
not disappear as a result of the bankruptcy).12 The fourth variation on 
this theme is a trust. If some of the debtor’s assets are held in trust for my 
claim or claims like it, this may give me superior treatment—treatment 
that is in fact the closest substitute for a lien. A fifth protection is exemp-
tion from the automatic stay.13 If I am not subject to the automatic stay, I 
can continue insisting on performance from the debtor, which may force 
the debtor to use unencumbered assets to satisfy its obligations to me ra-
ther than to another creditor. 
It is worth mentioning one lien substitute that does not protect a 
creditor in bankruptcy but can be very important outside of bankruptcy: 
the term of the obligation. If most of the debtor’s obligations have a long 
duration, a creditor can increase the likelihood of repayment by lending 
to the debtor on a short term basis.14 An obligation that will be repaid be-
fore the debtor’s other obligations come due may be nearly as well pro-
tected as obligations secured by a lien or entitled to priority. Bankruptcy 
eliminates this benefit, at least with respect to prebankruptcy obligations, 
by treating short term and long term obligations the same. 
The implications of the existence of numerous mechanisms for en-
suring the special treatment of a creditor point in two different direc-
tions. To the extent one of the lien substitutes is in fact functionally the 
same as a lien, it generally should be given the same treatment in bank-
ruptcy.15 If the lien substitute is not a true substitute for a lien, by con-
trast, we need to be mindful of the implications of the distinctions. Let 
me take up each implication in turn. 
                                                                                                                                      
 11. In addition to the formal priorities in 11 U.S.C. § 507 and § 726, critical vendor doctrine cre-
ates an informal priority for creditors whose relationship with the debtor is deemed essential. Thanks 
to the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) gives a special priority to cred-
itors who supplied goods to the debtor within twenty days of bankruptcy. 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) makes particular debts nondischargeable in cases involving individuals. 11 
U.S.C. § 727(a), which applies to debtors of all kinds, withholds the discharge altogether under speci-
fied circumstances. 
 13. The stay is found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and a number of exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). 
 14. In the sovereign debt context, which lacks a bankruptcy regime, a debtor’s ability to borrow 
on an increasingly short-term basis as its financial condition deteriorates creates a serious risk of debt 
dilution. See Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role 
of Seniority, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 879, 895 (2009). 
 15. To be sure, form is sometimes permitted to prevail over substance, usually in the interests of 
promoting certainty. A classic example in corporate law is Delaware’s rejection of de facto merger 
doctrine. See, e.g., Ernest L. Folk, III, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. ARCO Electronics, 
Inc., 49 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1963). But permitting the parties to achieve different treatment for func-
tionally similar transactions is an accommodation, not an optimal state of affairs. 
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Thomas Jackson made the functional similarity point in an early ar-
ticle exploring issues of particular interest for this Article.16 In the 1980s, 
courts wrestled with the question whether a constructive trust under state 
law should be given the same treatment as a statutory lien. In each con-
text, Jackson argued, a creditor or class of creditors has a special claim to 
assets that are subject to the lien or trust.17 Given the functional similari-
ty, he concluded, “[n]o section . . . suggests that the decision of nonbank-
ruptcy law to treat something as a constructive trust should be treated 
with any different respect than the decision of nonbankruptcy law to 
treat something as a statutory lien.”18 
Courts have often been relatively good at recognizing the functional 
similarity of liens and lien substitutes. One high profile example was a 
spate of cases addressing the question whether state or federal environ-
mental regulators are subject to the automatic stay when they seek to en-
force environmental obligations after a debtor has filed for bankruptcy.19 
If regulators are permitted to insist on specific performance of the debt-
or’s obligations, the effect is the same as giving regulators a lien on the 
debtors’ unencumbered assets. In the Kovacs case, which addressed the 
closely related question of whether regulatory obligations were dis-
charged by bankruptcy, Justice O’Connor made the point explicit:20 If 
state lawmakers wished to ensure that environmental obligations receive 
special treatment, she said, they can give them a formal lien.21 
Although liens and lien substitutes are functionally similar, there of-
ten are important differences between a lien and any given lien substi-
tute. Even trusts, the closest analogue to a lien, are different than liens in 
some respects.22 The differences between a lien, on the one hand, and 
priority treatment or an exception to the stay, on the other, are much 
greater. To see this, it may be useful to begin by cataloguing three key 
attributes of a lien. I then will give a prominent current example of a lien 
substitute that functions differently than a lien. 
The first attribute of a paradigmatic lien is transparency, usually as a 
result of public notice: it is easy to determine whether the debtor’s assets 
are subject to the lien. In most instances, a security interest in personal 
property is perfected by recording the interest in a public registry or (less 
often) by taking possession of the collateral.23 Statutory liens are a matter 
of formal state or federal law, and in many instances even people who 
                                                                                                                                      
 16. Thomas H. Jackson, Statutory Liens and Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Undoing the 
Confusion, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 288 (1987). 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. at 294. Jackson notes that section 545, which I discuss in the next Part, may qualify this 
slightly, but does not change the general point about functional similarity. Id. 
 19. For a very good summary and analysis of the cases, see Kathryn R. Heidt, The Automatic 
Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69 (1993). 
 20. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 21. Id. at 286. (“[A] State may protect its interest in the enforcement of its environmental laws 
by giving cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or secured claims.”). 
 22. See infra Part V (discussing trusts in the pension context). 
 23. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2014) (perfection by filing); § 9-313(a)(perfection by possession).  
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are not in the habit of reading the lawbooks would not be surprised to 
learn that a lien is in effect. The handwringing in the caselaw and litera-
ture about the evils of “secret liens” is itself evidence of the importance 
of transparency. 
Second, because they are property-based and effective against third 
parties, liens facilitate asset partitioning, to borrow a concept that has 
figured prominently in recent literature on corporate law.24 Although the 
asset partitioning achieved by liens is not as complete as with the for-
mation of a separate corporate entity, it serves some of the same func-
tions.25 A lien may facilitate monitoring by enabling the lien creditor to 
focus its monitoring efforts on a particular type of collateral, or by assur-
ing the lien creditor with a blanket lien that it has first dibs on most or all 
of the debtor’s assets. Like separate incorporation, although to a lesser 
extent, floating liens also can discourage inefficient liquidation of a debt-
or’s assets. A creditor with a lien on all the debtor’s assets is unlikely to 
permit the debtor’s assets to be dismembered in piecemeal fashion if the 
assets are more valuable as a going concern.26 Bankruptcy augments the 
protection against premature liquidation by subjecting lien creditors to 
the automatic stay.27 A creditor with a lien on a portion of the debtor’s 
assets cannot simply sell the collateral after the debtor files for bankrupt-
cy. The creditor must first ask the court to lift the stay, which reduces the 
risk of a collateral sale that destroys going concern value.28 
A third attribute of a paradigmatic lien is that the property interest 
it creates is effective both inside and outside of bankruptcy. If I have tak-
en my car to a garage for major engine work, but have not paid for it, the 
mechanic’s lien securing my payment of the obligation will protect my 
mechanic in bankruptcy if I file for bankruptcy, and outside of bankrupt-
cy if I do not. Some lien substitutes, such as exemption from the automat-
ic stay, have a similar effect; others, such as state law priority rules, may 
not. 
As my use of the term “paradigmatic” to describe the liens I have 
been discussing suggests, some liens do not have all of the attributes I 
have just described. This raises the question whether a purported lien is 
indeed a lien from a doctrinal perspective, and whether it should be a 
lien from a normative perspective. Lien substitutes raise essentially the 
same questions. 
                                                                                                                                      
 24. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387 (2000); Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 
(2006). 
 25. As Hansmann and Kraakman recognize in their work on asset partitioning. 
 26. The general financer’s incentives are imperfect, however. If a general financer is oversecured 
in bankruptcy, it may have too great an incentive to press for liquidation. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & 
Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 514 
(2009) (finding that bankruptcy sales are more likely and traditional reorganization less likely with 
debtors that have oversecured secured creditors). 
 27. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (2012) (staying enforcement of liens).  
 28. See id. § 362(d)(2) (permitting court to lift stay only if the secured creditor is undersecured 
and the collateral is not necessary to an effective reorganization). 
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The most vivid current examples of the distinction between an ordi-
nary lien and a lien substitute are derivatives, repos, and other financial 
contracts. As is now well known, the counterparty to a derivative is not 
subject to the preference or constructive fraud rules,29 is not subject to 
bankruptcy’s anti-ipso facto provisions,30 and is exempt from the auto-
matic stay to the extent the stay would otherwise limit the counterparty’s 
right to effect a set off of its obligations.31 These rules are sometimes re-
ferred to as special “priorities” for derivatives, especially by the financial 
press.32 Strictly speaking, they are not priorities. To the extent a deriva-
tive is undercollateralized, it is treated as an ordinary unsecured claim. 
But the derivatives counterparty can receive payments or additional col-
lateral on the eve of bankruptcy without fear that the payments will be 
retrieved as preferences.33 The counterparty also can sell any collateral it 
has at any time, without fear of interference from the court.34 This special 
status is neither a priority nor a lien, but it is a substitute for both. 
Although the derivatives safe harbors are functionally similar to 
liens, they are less transparent and provide less protection against liqui-
dation than traditional liens. Derivatives’ lack of transparency is magni-
fied by their insulation from preference challenge. By insisting on addi-
tional collateral, a counterparty can “feed” its lien at any time, even if a 
bankruptcy filing is clearly on the horizon.35 The size of a counterparty’s 
lien is thus less certain (and less transparent) than with other creditors, 
whose efforts to add collateral on the eve of bankruptcy will be avoided 
as a preference. Any collateral a derivatives counterparty grabs will not 
be available for other creditors. 
The absence of liquidation protection stems from the right of a de-
rivatives counterparty to terminate its contract and sell collateral at any 
time. Unlike ordinary lien creditors, who are prevented by the automatic 
stay from engaging in value destroying asset sales, a derivatives counter-
party has complete discretion whether and when to sell its collateral. 
AIG’s inability to prevent counterparties from insisting on additional 
collateral and threatening to terminate their credit default swaps, even if 
                                                                                                                                      
 29. Id. § 546(e). 
 30. See, e.g., id. § 560 (swap counterparties permitted to terminate contract). 
 31. See, e.g., id. § 362(b)(17) (exempting swaps). For a more complete overview of the safe har-
bors for financial contracts, see Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New 
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 641 (2005).  
 32. See, e.g., Ellen Brown, Winner Takes All: The Superpriority Status of Derivatives, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 11, 2013 2:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ellen-brown/winner-
takes-all-the-supe_b_3054522.html. 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). 
 34. At least if the counterparty does so promptly. In the Lehman bankruptcy, Judge Peck held 
that counterparties relinquished their immunity from the stay if they waited too long to terminate. See 
In re Lehman Bros. Holding Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 35. JPMorgan Chase, as Lehman’s triparty repo clearing bank, did precisely this on the eve of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency 
and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 165 (2012). 
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AIG filed for bankruptcy, was a key feature in its September 2008 col-
lapse.36 
I have argued elsewhere that the derivatives safe harbors should be 
removed, and thus that derivatives should be treated more like other 
contracts in bankruptcy.37 For present purposes, the more relevant points 
are simply that liens and lien substitutes are not fully interchangeable, 
and that departures from the traditional attributes of a lien can prove 
problematic. 
III. STATE PRIORITIES AND LIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
In my overview of the basic attributes of a lien, I included the fact 
that liens are ordinarily good for all seasons, valid both inside and out-
side of bankruptcy. This feature lies at the heart of an important limita-
tion on bankruptcy’s recognition of liens: under section 545, a lien is not 
valid if it first takes effect when the debtor becomes insolvent or files for 
bankruptcy.38 This provision has an intriguing and largely forgotten histo-
ry that underscores several of the points made in the previous Part.39 
The history of bankruptcy’s treatment of statutory liens begins not 
with liens but with priorities. As originally enacted, the 1898 Act incor-
porated any nonbankruptcy priorities that were honored under state or 
federal law.40 Concerned that there was little or nothing left for general 
unsecured creditors in most cases after state law priorities were satisfied, 
lawmakers largely eliminated state law priorities under the Chandler Act 
of 1938, which made major changes to the 1898 Act.41 The only state law 
priority that the Chandler Act retained was any priority for rent owed to 
a landlord, and this priority was limited to rent that accrued within three 
months of bankruptcy.42 
Although ordinary state priorities were no longer enforceable in 
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Act did honor state priorities that looked 
like liens—that is, state priorities that gave a creditor the right to attach 
property.43 As of 1938, the Bankruptcy Act thus distinguished among 
                                                                                                                                      
 36. See, e.g., id. at 165–66. 
 37. Id. at 176–80 (repos), 180–92 (swaps); Darrell Duffie & David Skeel, A Dialogue on the Costs 
and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements, in BANKRUPTCY NOT 
BAILOUT: A SPECIAL CHAPTER 14 at 133 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor, eds. 2012). Stephen 
Lubben and Mark Roe also have argued for reform of the safe harbors. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, 
Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319 (2010); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Mar-
ket’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011). 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 545. 
 39. Not everyone has forgotten the history. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 294; Richard M. Hynes 
& Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Priority Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
609, 645–47 (2014). 
 40. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 64b(5), 30 Stat. 544, (1898) (prior to Chandler Act of 
1938). 
 41. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 74TH CONG., ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889 at 
201 (Comm. Print 1936). 
 42. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 64(a)(5), 52 Stat. 840, 874 (1938). 
 43. Id. at 876. 
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priorities, priorities that looked like liens, and traditional liens.44 The first 
was overridden in bankruptcy, while the other two were given effect.45 
To the extent state lawmakers paid attention to these things, it was 
not hard for them to reestablish the validity of state created priorities. If 
they added lien-like attributes that sprang into effect in the event of in-
solvency or bankruptcy to the basic priority rule, the priority would re-
tain its force in bankruptcy. In the two decades after the Chandler Act 
was enacted, many states appeared to do just this.46 In the words of a sub-
sequent Ninth Circuit decision recounting the history, “[c]reditors’ 
groups quickly exerted pressure on state legislatures to preserve their fa-
vored position by upgrading their state priorities to the status of liens, 
thus perpetuating the conflict between state and federal priorities which 
the Chandler Act had been expected to end.”47 
In 1966, after more than a decade of lobbying by bankruptcy law-
yers and others, Congress took another stab at the perceived problem.48 
This amendment, the precursor to current section 545, invalidated state 
statutory liens that did not take effect prior to a debtor’s bankruptcy or 
insolvency.49 The amendment was “an attempt to minimize state conflicts 
with federal priorities by invalidating as against the trustee some of the 
more obviously spurious liens, those which function more as priorities in 
bankruptcy than as property interests.”50 
The standard normative justification for the distinction established 
by the 1966 amendment—which has been retained as section 545 of the 
Bankruptcy Code51—is that limiting statutory liens to those that are valid 
in all contexts reduces forum shopping. “A creditor enjoying a state-
created priority [that is valid only in bankruptcy] . . . may try to initiate a 
bankruptcy proceeding because bankruptcy serves it well, even though a 
collective proceeding would not be beneficial to the group of creditors,” 
as Jackson puts it.52 
It should be noted, however, that the approach that has emerged 
cannot be fully explained in these terms. If a state enacts a priority that 
would apply both in a state insolvency proceeding, such as an assignment 
for the benefit of creditors, and in bankruptcy, the priority will be over-
                                                                                                                                      
 44. Id. at 877. 
 45. Compare Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 64(a)(5), 52 Stat. 840, 874 (1938), with Bankruptcy Act, 
ch. 575, § 67(c), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938). 
 46. See Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enterprises), 524 F.2d 761, 764 (9th 
Cir. 1975). 
 47. Id. 
 48. The U.S. Department of the Treasury apparently was responsible for at least some of the 
delay, because of concerns about the priority of federal taxes. See, e.g., Frank R. Kennedy, The Bank-
ruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. L. REV. 149, 150 (1967). The concerns that gave rise to the 1966 
changes are also discussed in Frank R. Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. REV. 697, 
697 (1955); Note, Vacation in Bankruptcy of Statutory Wage Earners’ Priorities Established in Previous 
State Insolvency Proceedings, 51 YALE L.J. 863, 867 (1942). 
 49. Mark S. Dray, The Bankruptcy Act: Some Effects of the 1966 Amendments to Sections 17(a), 
67(c), & 70(c), 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 431, 434 (1967). 
 50. In re Telemart Enterprises, 524 F.2d at 764. 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (2012). 
 52. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 85 (1986). 
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ridden in bankruptcy. A creditor that is favored in a state law assignment 
thus has an incentive to press for a state law resolution of financial dis-
tress, whereas creditors who fare better in bankruptcy have the opposite 
incentive.53 One possible explanation is that the framework is flawed and 
does not fully achieve its objective. Perhaps Congress made a mistake 
when it invalidated state law priorities.54 But there also may be legitimate 
reasons for having somewhat different rules in place in bankruptcy as 
opposed to outside of bankruptcy. If this is the case—a possibility I will 
explore more fully in the next two Parts—Congress may be justified in 
rejecting the kinds of lien substitutes that alarmed the drafters of sec-
tion 545. 
IV. GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS IN DETROIT 
Nowhere has the status of nonbankruptcy liens and lien substitutes 
taken on as much urgency as in the recent municipal bankruptcies of  
Detroit and other cities. In Detroit, many holders of general obligation 
bonds initially questioned whether their bonds could be restructured in 
bankruptcy, though it quickly became clear that their optimism was mis-
placed.55 A small group of GO bondholders, known as unlimited tax GO 
bonds, insisted, somewhat more credibly, that their bonds had priority 
status and were protected by a lien.56 In the discussion that follows, I con-
sider the treatment of each form of GO bond in turn. 
A. The Vulnerability of Ordinary GO Bonds 
On the eve of Detroit’s bankruptcy, many sophisticated municipal 
bond investors assumed that all GO bonds would be fully protected in 
bankruptcy.57 Unlike with a revenue bond—which is secured by a stream 
of revenue such as water or sewer fees58—GO bonds are backed by the 
“full faith and credit” of the municipality.59 If the revenues securing a 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. Hynes & Walt make a similar point. Hynes & Walt, supra note 39, at 646–47 (“Some states 
grant priority to state and wage claims in ways that are different than the priority that such claims 
would receive in bankruptcy.”). 
 54. Jackson notes the puzzle and speculates that bankruptcy and insolvency specific state priori-
ties are rare. JACKSON, supra note 52, at 85 n.35. He seems to be right about this, although the in-
creased use of state insolvency proceedings in the past decade has magnified the importance of exist-
ing differences. 
 55. See generally Steven Malanga, Detroit’s Message to Investors: There Will be Blood, CITY J., 
Spring 2014, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2014/24_2_snd-detroit-bankruptcy.html (charac-
terizing the Detroit emergency manager’s threat to treat GO bonds as unsecured as “unprecedented”). 
 56. See, e.g., Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint 
for Declaratory Judgment at 47–48, Nat’l. Pub. Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Detroit (In re City of  
Detroit), Case No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2014) (arguing that unlimited tax GO bonds 
are secured by lien and qualify as revenue bonds) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Opposition Motion]. For a 
recent overview of the treatment of GO bonds, informed by bondholders’ experience in the Detroit 
case, see National Association of Bond Lawyers, General Obligation Bonds: State Law, Bankruptcy 
and Disclosure Considerations (Aug. 2014). 
 57. See, e.g., Mousseau & Comes, supra note 3. 
 58. The formal definition of revenue bonds is in 11 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2012).  
 59. Many GO bonds also are approved by municipal voters. 
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revenue bond fall short, the bondholders have no further recourse. Rev-
enue bonds are somewhat vulnerable as a result. With GO bonds, by 
contrast, the municipality commits all of its taxing authority to repay-
ment.60 As New York’s highest court put it in a much-cited case arising 
out of New York City’s financial crisis in the 1970s, “an obligation con-
taining a pledge of the city’s ‘faith and credit’ is secured by a promise 
both to pay and to use in good faith the city’s general revenue powers to 
produce sufficient funds to pay the principal and interest of the obliga-
tion as it becomes due.”61 By this reasoning, GO bonds are quite safe, 
whereas revenue bonds are precarious. 
In bankruptcy, this widespread perception turns out to be exactly 
backwards. Although revenue bondholders do not have further recourse 
if the revenue stream is not sufficient to ensure repayment, their lien on 
the revenue stream itself is fully protected. Indeed, revenue bondholders 
are in some respects treated even more favorably than other lien holders. 
Congress amended the municipal bankruptcy provisions in 1988 to make 
clear that the lien continues to attach to postpetition revenues.62 And 
revenue bonds are given a major exemption from the automatic stay.63 
GO bonds do not enjoy any of these protections. A municipality’s 
“full faith and credit” commitment does not by itself create a lien,64 which 
means that the claims of GO bondholders are unsecured in bankruptcy, 
and need not be paid in full. The vulnerability of GO bonds is reflected 
in the significant writedown they received in the Detroit case.65 
B. The Special Case of Unlimited Tax GO Bonds 
In the Detroit bankruptcy, one group of GO bondholders insisted 
that their bonds were secured by a fully enforceable lien, even if ordinary 
                                                                                                                                      
 60. Stoyan Bojinov, Two Types of Bonds: General Obligation vs. Revenue Bonds, 
MUNICIPALBONDS.COM (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.municipalbonds.com/education/read/60/two-types 
-of-bonds-general-obligation-vs-revenue-bonds. 
 61. Flushing Nat’l. Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp. for New York, 358 N.E.2d 848, 851 (N.Y. 
1976). Although Flushing is routinely cited as evidence of the sanctity of GO bonds, the court actually 
declined to insist on immediate performance. “Plaintiff and other noteholders of the city are entitled 
to some judicial relief free of throttling by the moratorium statute,” the court held, “but they are not 
entitled immediately to extraordinary or any particular judicial measures unnecessarily disruptive of 
the city’s delicate financial and economic balance.” Id. at 855.  
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 928(a). Under section 552(a), which is incorporated into Chapter 9 by section 
901, a prebankruptcy lien does not attach to collateral obtained by the debtor postpetition. Section 
928(a) makes clear that this provision does not cut off attachment of a revenue bond to postpetition 
revenues. 
 63. Id. § 922(d) (stating the stay does not prevent use of pledged revenues to pay revenue bond-
holders). 
 64. As the Flushing court noted, “[T]he effect of such pledge of ‘full faith and credit’ is not to 
create a general or special lien or charge . . . .” Flushing, 358 N.E.2d. at 851 (quoting State v. County of 
Citrus, 157 So. 4, 11 (1934)). 
 65. See, e.g., Oral Opinion on the Record at 17, In re City of Detroit, Case No. 13-53846 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2014) (estimating recovery on limited tax GO bonds at 41 percent); compare Third 
Amended Disclosure Statement With Respect to Third Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of 
the City of Detroit at 31, In re City of Detroit, Case No. 13-53846, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2014) 
(earlier proposed plan estimating recovery on limited tax GO bonds at 10-13%) [hereinafter Third 
Amended Disclosure Statement]. 
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GO bonds were not.66 Roughly $388 million in amount, these insured Un-
limited Tax General Obligation bonds differed from other GO bonds in 
at least one key respect. In addition to the usual commitment of Detroit’s 
“full faith and credit,” the resolutions approving the bond authorized 
Detroit to levy an additional ad valorem tax to generate funds for repay-
ing the bonds.67 The holders of these bonds argued that they had a lien on 
the ad valorem taxes,68 and that the nature of this interest transformed 
their GO bonds into revenue bonds.69 
In effect, the bondholders claimed that their bonds were both GO 
bonds and revenue bonds—in effect, they were like revenue bonds that 
also included recourse against Detroit in the event of any deficiency. 
Whether the provision for a special ad valorem tax did indeed create a 
valid lien on revenues was hotly disputed during the bankruptcy case.70 
Some observers suspected that the bankruptcy judge would rule against 
the bondholders if forced to decide.71 The parties settled the dispute on 
terms that appear to imply that the bonds were indeed revenue bonds.72 
The important point for present purposes, however, is that the bond-
holders’ comparative success does not imply that GO bondholders are 
something other than unsecured creditors. The unlimited tax GO bond-
holders’ case for special treatment rested on a claim that they were not 
simply GO bonds.73 Both sides assumed that ordinary GO bonds are un-
secured claims. 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. Several other classes of GO bonds were secured by revenues that were not in dispute. See, 
e.g., Third Disclosure Statement with Respect to Third Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of 
the City of Detroit at 29–30, In re City of Detroit, Case No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 
2014) (describing secured treatment of GO bonds in classes 2A–2F). 
 67. See Order of the Emergency Manager of the City of Detroit in id. at 197. 
 68. The bondholders argued that their bonds were revenue bonds secured by a lien on special ad 
valorem taxes authorized by Detroit resolutions approving the bonds. According to the bondholders, 
Michigan Acts 189 and 34 provided statutory authority for the lien, and the Detroit resolutions ap-
proving the bonds “confirm that the City has ‘pledge[d] to pay the principal of and the interest on the 
[Unlimited Tax Bonds] from the proceeds of an annual levy of ad valorem taxes on all taxable proper-
ty in the City.’” Plaintiffs’ Opposition Motion, supra note 56, at 47. 
 69. For the bondholders’ purposes, it was important that the bonds be found both to be secured 
by a lien, and to be revenue bonds. If the bondholders had a lien, but the bonds did not qualify as rev-
enue bonds, section 552 would prevent the lien from attaching to postpetition revenues. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a) (2012). This would render the lien essentially useless. 
 70. See Diane Bukowski, Wall Street Attacks Detroit Bankruptcy Cops Lawsuit, VOICE OF 
DETROIT (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.voiceofdetroit.net/2014/02/18/wall-street-attacks-detroit-
bankruptcy-cops-lawsuit/. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Under the terms of the settlement, seventy-four percent ($287.5 million) of the bondholders’ 
claims would be fully reinstated, and the remaining would be used to pay retiree pensions. See State-
ment of Detroit Bankruptcy Mediators, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich. (April 9, 2014). Tak-
en literally, this seems to suggest that the bonds are entitled to one-hundred percent payment, but 
bondholders agreed to “gift” some of their payment to pension recipients.  
 73. Plaintiffs’ Opposition Motion, supra note 56, at 35 (“That the Unlimited Tax Bonds are also 
backed by the ‘full faith, credit and resources of the City’ does not diminish or obscure the additional, 
specific pledge of special ad valorem tax revenues.”). 
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V. GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: THE RHODE ISLAND LIEN 
STATUTE 
One response to the vulnerability of GO bonds is to obtain security 
for the particular bond issuance. Rhode Island has recently attempted to 
achieve this effect by statute for all GO bonds.74 
In 2011, as it became clear that the small Rhode Island town of  
Central Falls would soon be filing for Chapter 9, bond market partici-
pants warned that failure to pay Central Falls’ general obligation bonds 
in full would have a ruinous effect on the bond markets in Rhode Island, 
and the contagion might spread beyond Rhode Island as well.75 In re-
sponse to these warnings, Rhode Island legislators quickly passed a new 
statute that purported to give bondholders a lien on all of a municipali-
ty’s revenues.76 Central Falls did subsequently file for bankruptcy,77 and 
the statute ensured that its bondholders emerged unscathed. 
Under the Rhode Island statute: 
The faith and credit ad valorem taxes, and general fund revenues of 
each city, town and district shall be pledged for the payment of the 
principal of, premium and the interest on, all general obligation 
bonds and notes of the city or town . . . and shall constitute a first 
lien on such ad valorem taxes and general fund revenues.78 
The statute states that the “first lien” status of general obligation 
bonds does not require a security agreement or perfection under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, and that the lien is “deemed continuously 
perfected from the time the bonds or notes or other financing obligations 
are issued.”79 General obligation bondholders are thus given a first priori-
ty lien on essentially all of the city’s revenues as of the moment the bonds 
are issued. 
When Central Falls filed for bankruptcy as expected, the new lien 
statute achieved the desired effect. Although Central Falls significantly 
restructured its pension obligations, it has continued to make its GO 
bond payments in full and on time.80 The statute is quite unusual, but it 
does not appear to have been challenged in the Central Falls case. Why 
did the pension recipients, many of whose pensions were cut by fifty-five 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html 
?_r=1&. 
 75. See generally Mary Williams Walsh & Abby Goodnough, A Small City’s Depleted Pension 
Fund Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/business/ 
central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcy-over-pension-promises.html (describing contagion concerns). 
 76. Bidgood, supra note 74. 
 77. Scott Malone, Rhode Island’s Central Falls Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2011, 
4:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-rhodeisland-centralfalls-idUSTRE7703ID2011 
0801. 
 78. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1(a) (West 2014). 
 79. Id. at § 45-12-1(b)(1). 
 80. See, e.g., Dunstan Prial, In Rhode Island Bankruptcy, Bondholders Came First, FOX 
BUSINESS (July 24, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/government/2013/07/24/in-rhode-island-
bankrputcy-bondholders-came-first/. 
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percent, not object to this special protection for GO bonds? The acquies-
cence appears to be explained by a key feature of Central Falls’ GO 
bonds. Nearly all of the money used for the bond payments comes from 
Rhode Island itself, rather than from Central Falls. As a result, restruc-
turing the bonds would not have freed up any additional value to pay 
pension recipients and other Central Falls creditors.81 
In the discussion that follows, I consider a series of potential objec-
tions to the Rhode Island approach. I begin with two possible objections 
to the lien statute that do not turn on the nature of the lien it creates. I 
then turn to the question whether the statute is a lien that is or should be 
enforceable in bankruptcy. 
A. Is the Statute a Fraudulent Conveyance? 
One possible, though probably unavailing objection is that the lien 
statute was a fraudulent conveyance.82 Under bankruptcy’s fraudulent 
conveyance provision, a transfer that occurs on or within two years of a 
debtor’s bankruptcy can be invalidated if the debtor “made such trans-
fer . . . with actual intent to hinter, delay, or defraud” its creditors; or if 
the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change” for the transfer and was insolvent or nearly insolvent at the 
time.83 The first form of fraudulent conveyance, actual fraud, clearly 
would not apply to Central Falls or other Rhode Island municipalities. 
The statute gave Central Falls’ bondholders a lien on Central Falls’ reve-
nues, which is a transfer of Central Falls property. But the state, not  
Central Falls, was the entity that effected the transfer. It is hard to imag-
ine how Central Falls could be said to have intentionally defrauded its 
creditors when the statute was enacted, since Central Falls was a by-
stander to the enactment. 
With the second form of fraudulent conveyance—known as con-
structive fraud—things get more interesting. On its face, the enactment 
of the Rhode Island statute does seem to satisfy the requirements for 
                                                                                                                                      
 81. The discussion in this paragraph is based on a presentation by one of the drafters of the 
Rhode Island statute, Karen S. D. Grande, Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP, at the “Judicial Symposi-
um on the Law and Economics of Pension Reform” sponsored by the Law & Economic Center of 
George Mason University School of Law in Charleston, S.C., April 27, 2014. 
 82. The effect of the Rhode Island statute looks even more like a prebankruptcy preference, but 
bankruptcy law precludes preference challenges in this context. Ordinarily, a transfer to a creditor in 
connection with a prior debt can be avoided if it occurs within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing. 11 
U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012). The Rhode Island statute transferred a property interest to the Central Falls 
bondholders shortly before the Central Falls bankruptcy filing, and thus seems vulnerable at first 
glance. But 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) prohibits the debtor or trustee from challenging “the fixing of a stat-
utory lien” as a preference. Moreover, although municipal bankruptcy law permits the bankruptcy 
judge to appoint a trustee to bring preference actions that the debtor fails to pursue, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 926(a), the trustee is not permitted to avoid transfers “to or for the benefit of the holder of a bond” 
under section 547. 11 U.S.C. § 926(b). 
 83. See id. § 548(a)(1). Most states have very similar fraudulent conveyance provisions, often 
with a longer statute of limitations. The trustee also can invoke these provisions, because 11 U.S.C. 
§ 544(b) authorizes her to use any provision that an existing creditor could have used outside of bank-
ruptcy. 
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constructive fraud. With constructive fraud, the question is whether  
Central Falls received reasonably equivalent value when a lien was given 
to its general obligation bondholders, and whether it was insolvent or 
nearly so. Central Falls did not receive anything in return for the new 
lien, and it is quite plausible that Central Falls was insolvent at the time. 
The principal obstacle to the fraudulent conveyance argument is 
that the Bankruptcy Code defines value to include “securing of a present 
or antecedent debt of the debtor,”84 which suggests that the original value 
given by general obligation bondholders when they purchased their 
bonds counts as value given in return for the lien created by Rhode  
Island’s lien statute. Only if Central Falls’ creditors could argue that the 
original purchase should not count as value for some reason, would they 
have had a plausible fraudulent conveyance challenge.85 
B. Does the Statute Violate the Contracts Clause? 
A second potential challenge to the Rhode Island statute comes 
from the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution and a comparable 
provision in Rhode Island’s constitution. Under the Contracts Clause, 
states are not permitted to “impair” contracts.86 Although the Contracts 
Clause has been construed more narrowly when a city or state is in finan-
cial distress,87 it has generally been interpreted to prohibit a state from 
retroactively impairing contractual obligations.88 The Rhode Island stat-
ute obviously did not impair the obligations of Rhode Island municipal 
bondholders at all. It increased the likelihood that they would be repaid. 
But what about pension beneficiaries and other creditors? By giving 
bondholders a lien on nearly all of a city’s revenues, the Rhode Island 
statute arguably impaired the city’s obligations to these other creditors. 
It is not clear whether this kind of interference—which is indirect 
rather than direct—violates the Contracts Clause. Indirect claims pose an 
obvious slippery slope problem. After all, if indirect impairments violate 
the Contracts Clause, any municipal or state statute that favors a particu-
lar creditor or class of creditors could be seen as an impermissible im-
pairment of other creditors. Surely, the Contracts Clause does not sweep 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. Id. § 548(d)(2)(A). 
 85. Some bankruptcy courts have in fact concluded that the original extension of credit does not 
always constitute value for fraudulent conveyance purposes. See, e.g., In re Annand, 239 B.R. 511, 518 
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (suggesting that the court should consider all relevant facts). One possible analogy 
here is the invalidation by some courts of leveraged buyout transactions on fraudulent conveyance 
grounds, despite the fact that the lender extended substantial credit in return for the lien it received. 
See, e.g., Bay Plastics, Inc. v. BT Commercial Corp. (In re Bay Plastics, Inc.), 187 B.R. 315 (Bankr. 
C.D. Calif. 1995). 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . impair[] the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
 87. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 513–16 (1942) (up-
holding state bond restructuring statute); UAW v. Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismiss-
ing Contracts Clause objection to Puerto Rican legislation). 
 88. Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations and Vested Rights, 6 MARQ. L. 
REV. 129, 129 (1922); see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 260 (1827) (holding that the Contracts 
Clause prevents states from passing laws affecting contracts already signed, but that laws affecting fu-
ture contracts are to be construed as part of the contracts themselves). 
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so broadly. Probably not, although the effect of the Rhode Island lien 
statute was far more dramatic than with ordinary municipal or state ac-
tions.  
C. Does the Rhode Island Statute Create a Genuine Lien? 
Thus far, I have considered challenges to the Rhode Island statute 
that arise from transition issues. Once the statute has been in place for a 
few years, any fraudulent conveyance concerns will disappear. Similarly, 
creditors who extend credit to a Rhode Island municipality after the en-
actment of the statute in 2011 cannot raise Contracts Clause objections, 
since the Clause prohibits only retroactive impairment.89 In this Section, I 
take up a more general objection to the Rhode Island statute: the ques-
tion of whether the lien it creates is in fact a legitimate lien. 
How could a state statute that carefully and explicitly states that it is 
giving general obligation bondholders a lien on the city’s revenues not 
create a lien? One possible objection is that the lien created by the stat-
ute should be invalidated under section 545 because it has little real ef-
fect outside of bankruptcy.90 The second objection is that it is not really a 
lien at all; it is a state priority rule and should therefore be overridden in 
bankruptcy. 
Start with the first objection. By its terms, the Rhode Island statute 
is not problematic, since it creates a lien as of the moment a general obli-
gation bond is issued. To challenge the statute, a creditor would need to 
contend that the lien actually does not have any effect outside of bank-
ruptcy.91 One can in fact imagine such an argument. It is very difficult for 
a creditor to enforce an obligation against a municipality outside of 
bankruptcy, the reasoning might go; a creditor’s only realistic option is to 
seek a mandamus order compelling the municipality to use revenues to 
pay the credit. Historically, mandamus actions have not fared especially 
well.92 Moreover, a Rhode Island bondholder’s “lien” would not give it 
significantly greater rights than bondholders already had under the tradi-
tional “full faith and credit” promise included in the bonds. The real ef-
fect of the statutory lien is simply to enhance the bondholders’ priority in 
the event of bankruptcy. 
The chief limitation of this argument is that the new lien theoretical-
ly could have at least some effect outside of bankruptcy. It is possible, for 
instance, that a court would be slightly more willing to grant mandamus 
to holders of GO bonds subject to the new statute than it would be in the 
absence of the statute. 
                                                                                                                                      
 89. Roller, supra note 88, at 129. 
 90. 11 U.S.C. § 545(1)(A) (2012) (invalidating statutory liens that first become effective “when a 
case under this title concerning the debtor is commenced”). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 645 (2012) (noting that municipal officers “made a practice of avoiding [writs 
of mandamus] by resigning office”). 
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The second objection is that the lien is simply not a genuine lien. 
Traditional liens attach to particular property, such as equipment or a 
house. Although liens can attach to intangible assets as well, the reason-
ing might go, a lien on all revenues is too amorphous to constitute a lien. 
To assess the seriousness of this objection, it is useful to begin by com-
paring the Rhode Island lien to ordinary security interests under Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Because Article 9 excludes state-
created liens from its scope,93 it does not regulate the general obligation 
bonds of Rhode Island or other municipalities. But the analogy may shed 
light on the nature and permissible scope of liens. 
The first thing to note is that the lien created by the Rhode Island 
statute is most closely analogous to the floating liens authorized by Arti-
cle 9. A floating lien generally consists of a security interest in all of the 
debtor’s current and after-acquired personal property,94 and secures the 
repayment of any current or future loans from the secured creditor.95 The 
Rhode Island lien and the floating lien held by the general financer of an 
ordinary business are, in these respects, somewhat analogous. 
If we consider the normative rationales that have been developed to 
explain the role of floating liens, however, it quickly becomes apparent 
that floating liens have little in common with the Rhode Island lien. Ac-
cording to the leading normative account, the debtor’s general financer 
serves as the debtor’s principal monitor.96 The blanket lien discourages 
opportunism by the debtor and solidifies the general financer’s status as 
the principal monitor. This monitoring benefits not just the general fi-
nancer, but the debtor’s other creditors as well. The arrangement also 
benefits the debtor by reducing its overall cost of credit. 
Rhode Island’s general obligation bondholders are much less likely 
to serve as a municipality’s principal monitors, for the benefit of all credi-
tors. To the extent general obligation bondholders monitor, they tend to 
do so indirectly, through the signals sent by bond prices.97 The Rhode  
Island lien statute will diminish rather than enhance this benefit, since it 
                                                                                                                                      
 93. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2014) (Article 9 applies to security interests created “by con-
tract”). 
 94. Id. § 9-204(a) (authorizing security interests in after-acquired property). The secured creditor 
must describe the collateral in the security agreement that creates the security interest, and in the fi-
nancing statement that perfects it, but Article 9 permits very broad descriptions. The security agree-
ment cannot simply say “all personal property,” but a reference to different categories of collateral 
suffices. Id. § 9-108(c) (entitled “Supergeneric description not sufficient”); see, e.g., Cahill v. Fruehauf 
Corp. (In re Ass’n. Transp., Inc.), 3 B.R. 124, 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a broad de-
scription of collateral that goes on to list specific types of collateral is sufficient). For the financing 
statement, even “all personal property” is acceptable. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (“all assets or all personal 
property” is sufficient). 
 95. U.C.C. § 9-204(c) (future advances). 
 96. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 927 
(1986); see also Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 159, 169 (1997).  
 97. For a discussion of monitoring that takes this form, see generally Barry E. Adler, An Equity-
Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993). 
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assures that the bondholders will be paid even if the municipality is deep-
ly distressed.98 
The mismatch between the principal normative explanations for the 
use of a floating lien, and the role of a general obligation bondholder, re-
inforces the suspicion that the Rhode Island lien really is not a lien at all. 
It seems to function much more like a priority rule than a genuine lien. 
There are additional reasons for concern with the Rhode Island 
statute. If lenders are fully protected, they will lend even when their 
lending may be problematic.99 The prospect of excessive lending seems 
especially salient in the municipal context. Municipal decision makers al-
ready have too great an incentive to borrow because the loan proceeds 
are available now and repayment is not required until later. Assurance of 
priority may enable a municipality to continue to borrow even when it is 
unable to maintain basic services for its citizens. Rather than continuing 
to borrow, a better solution is for the municipality to restructure its obli-
gations in bankruptcy. 
From a doctrinal perspective, my conclusion is a tentative one: 
courts might plausibly conclude that the “lien” created by the Rhode  
Island lien statute is not a genuine lien, that it is best characterized as a 
state’s effort to alter bankruptcy priorities, and thus that it is not en-
forceable in bankruptcy. It is not clear that courts will, but they could. 
My analysis in this Section suggests that they should, and indeed that 
lawmakers should consider amending the statutory lien statute to make 
clear that statutory liens on all revenues are not enforceable in bankrupt-
cy.100 To be sure, this could create a difference between the treatment of 
bonds in bankruptcy and their treatment outside bankruptcy, potentially 
introducing forum shopping concerns. But the invalidity of “all reve-
nues” liens in bankruptcy might discourage other states from adopting 
such laws (as well as encouraging the parties to secure the GO bonds 
with more narrowly defined revenue streams if bondholders are con-
cerned about protection). The requirements for filing for Chapter 9 are 
sufficiently stringent,101 and the reluctance of cities to file for bankruptcy 
sufficiently great, that opportunistic use of Chapter 9 to restructure GO 
bonds seems relatively unlikely. 
VI. THE STATUS OF PUBLIC PENSION OBLIGATIONS 
The status of public pension beneficiaries in municipal bankruptcy 
raises an analogous set of issues about liens and lien substitutes. The is-
                                                                                                                                      
 98. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1(a) (West 2014). 
 99. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 
46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 925 (1993) (noting that priority status solves underinvestment concerns but can 
create an overinvestment problem). 
 100. It is worth noting that if Rhode Island is worried about bond contagion in the event its bond 
statute were not honored in a municipal bankruptcy, it has the option of refusing to permit its munici-
palities to file for Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) (requirement of state consent). 
 101. A municipal debtor must demonstrate that the municipality is insolvent and must meet sev-
eral other requirements that do not apply to other types of bankruptcy filings. Id. § 109(c).  
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sues were especially subtle in the Detroit bankruptcy, due to a provision 
in the Michigan Constitution stating that a public pension cannot be di-
minished or impaired.102 In this Part, I begin by exploring the issue 
whether the pension protection in the Michigan Constitution precludes 
restructuring. After concluding that the Detroit bankruptcy judge rightly 
determined it does not, I turn to the question whether pension benefi-
ciaries are protected by a lien or lien substitute. 
A. Does Michigan’s Constitution Preclude Restructuring?103 
In June, 2013, shortly before Detroit filed for bankruptcy, Emer-
gency Manager Kevyn Orr filed a report that served as a rude awakening 
for many of Detroit’s creditors, including its pension beneficiaries.104 Orr 
had been appointed at the end of March, 2013, pursuant to controversial 
state provisions that permit the governor to select an emergency manag-
er who would largely displace the mayor and city council if a city is in fi-
nancial distress.105 Contrary to the trustees of Detroit’s two major pen-
sion funds, who claimed that the pensions were adequately funded, Orr’s 
report estimated that they were underfunded by $3.5 billion.106 Even 
more radically, Orr also insisted that the pensions would need to be re-
duced, a step that pension beneficiaries insisted is impossible under 
Michigan law.107 
The key to the standoff between Detroit’s emergency manager and 
the pension beneficiaries was a provision that was added to Michigan’s 
Constitution in 1963. This provision states that accrued pension benefits 
“shall not be diminished or impaired.”108 To pension beneficiaries, the 
provision sounded like a trump card assuring that their pensions could 
not be touched. Outside of bankruptcy, they may have been right.109 And 
properly funded pensions are probably protected even in bankruptcy. 
But if a city has failed to fully fund its pensions, the unfunded portion of 
the pension may be subject to restructuring in bankruptcy. 
How can this conclusion be reconciled with Michigan’s Constitu-
tion, with its very clear promise that pension benefits “shall not be dimin-
                                                                                                                                      
 102. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retire-
ment system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which 
shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”). 
 103. Parts of this Section draw on the discussion in Skeel, supra note 2. 
 104. CITY OF DETROIT: PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS (2013), available at http://www.detroit 
mi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf. 
 105. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549 (West 2014). 
 106. CITY OF DETROIT: PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 104, at 109. 
 107. I discuss many of the issues in this Section more fully in a white paper released a few weeks 
before the Detroit bankruptcy judge’s ruling eligibility ruling. David A. Skeel Jr., Can Pensions be 
Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal Bankruptcy, FEDERALIST SOC’Y WHITE PAPER (Oct. 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360302. 
 108. MICH. CONST. ART. XXIV, sec. 9. 
 109. Even outside of bankruptcy, Detroit may have had some ability to adjust its pensions given 
the city’s financial distress. The Supreme Court has long construed the Contracts Clause more flexibly 
in the context of a financial crisis. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 
502 (1942).  
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ished or impaired”? The simple answer is that federal law takes prece-
dence over state law—even state constitutional law—under the Suprem-
acy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.110 Because the U.S. Constitution au-
thorizes Congress to enact bankruptcy laws, and the municipal 
bankruptcy law that Congress has enacted permits a city to restructure its 
ordinary debts, the unfunded portion of a pension can be restructured 
even if state law seems to say pensions are sacrosanct.111  
Although I have described bankruptcy as overriding Michigan’s 
Constitution, this actually is an exaggeration. Michigan’s prohibition 
against impairing pensions was not added with bankruptcy in mind at all. 
Prior to 1963, a pension promise was simply a “gratuity” in Michigan, as 
in many other states.112 A city like Detroit could withdraw the promise at 
any time, even after a school teacher or fireman had worked for the city 
for decades and was about to retire. Michigan lawmakers wanted to put 
pension promises on sounder footing, by making them enforceable con-
tractual obligations. This does not mean that the obligation could never 
be restructured, even in bankruptcy; it means that a city like Detroit can-
not simply decide to withdraw its promise. Michigan lawmakers could 
have gone further, and forbidden even the most financially distressed city 
from filing for bankruptcy if they had wished to do so. Cities can only file 
for bankruptcy if their state consents to municipal bankruptcy filings.113 
This gave Michigan the power to just say no. But Michigan has permitted 
cities to file for bankruptcy since 1939, shortly after the first permanent 
municipal bankruptcy law was enacted.114 Indeed, not only did Michigan 
authorize municipal bankruptcy, but Michigan lawmakers such as Frank 
Murphy—the mayor of Detroit, later governor, and then a U.S. Supreme 
Court justice—were among the most vigorous advocates for municipal 
bankruptcy in the 1930s.115 
There also are strong normative grounds for the conclusion that 
pensions can be restructured, at least under some circumstances. One of 
the chief benefits of bankruptcy is that it distributes the sacrifice of fi-
nancial distress more broadly and equitably than is the case if a city is left 
to its own devices. If pensions could never be restructured, the cost of 
paying beneficiaries in cities that have made unsustainable pension 
promises would be borne by other constituencies, such as service recipi-
ents. 
The prospect of restructuring also may alter some of the perverse 
political incentives that have contributed to many cities’ financial dis-
                                                                                                                                      
 110. The Supremacy Clause states that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). 
 112. Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & 
POL’Y 617 (2012). 
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2). 
 114. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.201 (1948). 
 115. See, e.g., To Amend the Bankruptcy Act: Municipal and Private Corporations, Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d Cong. 84–92 (1933) (testimony of Hon. Frank Murphy, Mayor of 
the City of Detroit, Mich.). 
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tress. Although there are a variety of reasons for the current pension cri-
sis, one of the biggest problems in many cities has been the absence of 
genuine bargaining over the terms of pension promises. Public employ-
ees obviously would prefer a giant pension to a modest one, but so too 
would the politicians who ostensibly bargain with them. In some cases, 
politicians are part of the same pension system; even if they are not, they 
often depend on the votes of employees who are.116 Moreover, pension 
promises are commitments that can be made today but need not be paid 
until later. If an unsustainably generous pension can be restructured in 
bankruptcy, this gives employees much more of an interest in making 
sure that the pension promises are realistic, and that pensions are proper-
ly funded. 
B. Do Pension Beneficiaries Have a Lien or Lien Substitute? 
In the Detroit eligibility decision, Judge Steven Rhodes suggested 
that Detroit’s pension beneficiaries do not have a security interest or 
other property interest and thus are simply unsecured claimants in the 
Detroit bankruptcy.117 Strictly speaking, this statement seems accurate. 
But Detroit’s pension beneficiaries were protected to the extent that 
funds were set aside by them or by Detroit for their pensions.118 
Suppose that Detroit has promised $1000 in pension benefits to its 
pension beneficiaries, and that the beneficiaries and Detroit set aside 
$600 to fund these benefits, as of the date of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing. 
They contributed these funds to Detroit’s two major pension plans, the 
General Retirement System and the police and firefighters fund.119 The 
pension beneficiaries might wish to claim that they have a security inter-
est in the $600 in funds. The problem with this claim is that they have not 
taken any evident steps to create and perfect a security interest, and no 
Detroit or Michigan statute purports to give them a security interest in 
the funds or anything else.120 It is possible that a court would conclude 
that the common law could create a lien on the funds, but Judge Rhodes’ 
skepticism appears to be well-founded. 
                                                                                                                                      
 116. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, Shrouded Costs of Government: 
The Political Economy of State and Local Public Pensions 7–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 
Working Paper No. 18976, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18976 (model of political 
dynamics where public employees appreciate the value of pension benefits and ordinary voters do 
not). 
 117. Judge Rhodes pointed out that Michigan could have given pension beneficiaries a property 
interest or a security interest, or could have guaranteed the obligations, but did not. In re City of  
Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 118. This distinction is reflected in Detroit’s reorganization plan, which addressed only the un-
funded portion of pension beneficiaries’ claims. See Third Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 
65, at 34–38 (including only the unfunded portion of the accrued benefits of the two pensions in classes 
10 and 11 of the proposed plan).  
 119. RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, http://www.rscd.org (last visited Oct. 14, 
2014). 
 120. Third Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 65, at 34–38. 
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Even if there is no security interest, however, Detroit’s pension 
beneficiaries’ interest in the funds is protected in very similar fashion.121 
Detroit and its employees make their pension contributions to the two 
funds, which manage the money separately from Detroit’s finances. The 
structure of the funds is defined by the Detroit city charter, which re-
quires that the funds be overseen by trustees appointed by the city.122 
Under these circumstances, the funds are treated as being held in trust 
for the pension recipients.123 Indeed, even if the structure did not qualify 
as a statutory trust, a court would likely conclude that Detroit and its 
creditors do not have any interest in the moneys contributed to the 
funds.124 This is in fact precisely how Detroit handled the pensions in its 
debt adjustment plan: only the unfunded portion of the pensions was re-
structured. 
An explicit trust is the most lien-like of the lien substitutes. Like a 
lien, it is relatively transparent; trust assets are partitioned from a debt-
or’s other assets, and trust status has bite both inside and outside of 
bankruptcy. Yet even trusts differ from liens in several respects. Because 
the trust assets are owned by the beneficiary, not by the debtor, for in-
stance, they are not subject to the automatic stay.125 In theory, this means 
that the beneficiaries have complete access to the assets, even in bank-
ruptcy.126 
It is important to emphasize that the status of funds contributed by 
a city and its pension recipients will depend on how the pension is struc-
                                                                                                                                      
 121. In earlier writing on pensions in bankruptcy, I analogized pension beneficiaries’ interest in 
the funded portion of their pensions to a security interest. See David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankrupt-
cy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 692 (2012). As the text suggests, in the absence of state law creating a statu-
tory or common law lien, I think it more likely that the funds will be treated as property held in trust 
for the beneficiaries.  
 122. CHARTER OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, art. 11, § 11-103. 
 123. As noted earlier, Detroit’s reorganization plan was consistent with this intuition. See supra 
note 118. 
 124. In cases involving funds set aside in similar fashion in Chapter 11 cases, courts have held that 
the funds are not property of the estate. For instance, courts have enforced restrictions on grants to 
nonprofit hospitals and other charitable organizations. See, e.g., In re Joliet-Will Cnty. Cmty. Action 
Agency, 847 F.2d 430, 434–35 (7th Cir. 1988) (restricted grants made by federal and state agencies 
were not property of the debtor’s estate); Hunter v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr. (In re Parkview Hospital), 
211 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997) (funds donated to hospital for a particular purpose were not 
property of the hospital’s bankruptcy estate). 
 125. Hynes and Walt point out several additional distinctions: when a secured creditor’s collateral 
is worth more than the creditor is owed, the creditor is nevertheless only entitled to the amount it is 
owed. The excess value belongs to the debtor. With a trust, the assets belong entirely to the beneficiar-
ies. Hynes & Walt, supra note 39, at 651. In addition, trust assets are not subject to the automatic stay, 
id. at 652, and the grounds for avoidance of liens and trusts by a bankruptcy trustee are somewhat dif-
ferent. Id. at 657–59. 
 126. In contrast to an express trust, which is quite similar to a lien, constructive trusts are consid-
erably less transparent. A debtor’s other creditors often have no reason to be aware that some of the 
debtor’s property is subject to a constructive trust for a particular creditor or other party. Courts tend 
to view constructive trust claims with skepticism. See, e.g., XL/Datacomp, Inc., v. Wilson (In re  
Omegas Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1452 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Constructive trusts are anathema to the 
equities of bankruptcy since they take from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors, not 
from the offending debtor.”). But see In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, Inc., 745 F.3d 299, 305–08 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (criticizing Omegas and suggesting it may sometimes be appropriate to impose a construc-
tive trust).  
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tured. If the pension contributions are not separated from a municipali-
ty’s general funds in any way, they may not be treated as subject to a 
trust. And even if commingled contributions are found to be held in 
trust, courts often require that the funds be traced.127 
Other pension arrangements raise still other kinds of issues.  
California is especially interesting in this regard. Most California cities—
including San Bernardino and Stockton, each of which is currently in 
bankruptcy—are part of the statewide CalPERS system. CalPERS insists 
that these pensions cannot be restructured, even though Detroit could 
and did restructure its pensions, because CalPERS is an arm of the  
California government.128 In the Stockton case, the bankruptcy judge re-
jected CalPERS’s arguments, stating from the bench and then in a writ-
ten opinion that Stockton could restructure its obligations to the pension 
beneficiaries. But Stockton nevertheless declined to adjust the pensions, 
arguing that the city would incur steep costs if it did.129 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Municipal liens are in some respects quite different than liens in 
other contexts. In a traditional lending relationship, loans are secured by 
a lien on hard assets such as equipment and real estate. Municipal credi-
tors, by contrast, are usually given liens on revenues of various kinds. 
Most do not take lien on hard assets, in part because the lien would not 
be enforceable against any property that has a public function. 
Although some might suspect that these differences limit the rele-
vance of municipal lien issues, in my view quite the opposite is the case. 
The variations in the nature of liens offer valuable insights into the role 
that liens and lien substitutes play, and the choices the parties make 
when they are structuring their transactions. Given the emphasis on rev-
enues rather than hard assets, for instance, it is not surprising that munic-
ipal creditors often rely on trust arrangements rather than traditional 
liens. 
I have devoted much of my attention in this Article to the status of 
general obligation bonds and of pensions, each of which has been the 
                                                                                                                                      
 127. See, e.g., Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 1016 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that tracing obligation applies to express as well as constructive 
trusts, and that this “is necessary to further the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of equal distribution among 
similarl[y] situated creditors”). 
 128. See, e.g., Peter Mixon, Summary of CalPERS Legal Position in Municipal Bankruptcies ¶ 6 
(Sept. 12, 2012) (“The relationship between CalPERS and a municipal employer is not a mere com-
mercial contract between a creditor and a debtor. Instead, it is an aspect of the State’s control over a 
municipality that is protected from interference under constitutional principles and federal bankruptcy 
law.”); David B. Brandolph & Florence Olsen, Detroit Bankruptcy Filing Raises Constitutional Issues, 
Could Affect Other Plans, BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Aug. 12, 2013), http:// 
www.ncpers.org/files/BBNA%20DETROIT%20STORY.pdf (discussing comparisons between  
Detroit’s restructuring plan and CalPERS’s stance on the federal court’s ability to preempt state law 
protecting CalPERS beneficiaries). 
 129. See, e.g., Dale Kasler, Appeal Threatens Stockton Bankruptcy Ruling on Pensions, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article3932965.html; In re 
City of Stockton, California, Case No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015). 
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subject of considerable uncertainty in recent municipal bankruptcy cases. 
Much of the analysis has been descriptive. I concluded that traditional 
GO bondholders are simply general creditors, despite the municipal 
debtor’s “pledge” of its “full faith and credit” to support the bonds. I also 
concluded that pensions can be restructured in bankruptcy, even if the 
state constitution protects them, but that pension beneficiaries may be 
entitled to the funds that have been set aside on their behalf. 
While drawing these descriptive conclusions, I also suggested a vari-
ety of normative implications. I argued the unsecured status of tradition-
al GO bonds and the susceptibility of pensions to at least some restruc-
turing can have beneficial normative effects. At least on the margin, each 
counteracts problematic political incentives. The vulnerability of GO 
bonds may discourage excessive borrowing, and the prospect of pension 
restructuring may lead to pressure for more realistic funding of pensions. 
I also defended a functional approach to the treatment of liens and lien 
substitutes, and argued that it is appropriate to have somewhat different 
rules in bankruptcy than apply outside of bankruptcy in the contexts I 
have considered. 
 
